A Bioeconomic Approach to Marriage and the Sexual Division of Labor by Gurven, Michael et al.
Chapman University 
Chapman University Digital Commons 
ESI Publications Economic Science Institute 
4-23-2009 
A Bioeconomic Approach to Marriage and the Sexual Division of 
Labor 
Michael Gurven 
University of California, Santa Barbara 
Jeffrey Winking 
Texas A&M University 
Hillard Kaplan 
Chapman University, hkaplan@chapman.edu 
Christopher von Rueden 
University of California, Santa Barbara 
Lisa McAllister 
University of California, Santa Barbara 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_pubs 
 Part of the Biological and Physical Anthropology Commons, Economic Theory Commons, Ethnic 
Studies Commons, Latin American Studies Commons, Other Anthropology Commons, Other Economics 
Commons, and the Social and Cultural Anthropology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gurven, M., Winking, J., Kaplan, H., von Rueden, C., & McAllister, L. (2009). A bioeconomic approach to 
marriage and the sexual division of labor. Human Nature, 20(2), 151-183. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s12110-009-9062-8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in ESI Publications by an authorized administrator of Chapman 
University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact laughtin@chapman.edu. 
A Bioeconomic Approach to Marriage and the Sexual
Division of Labor
Michael Gurven & Jeffrey Winking &
Hillard Kaplan & Christopher von Rueden &
Lisa McAllister
Published online: 23 April 2009
# The Author(s) 2009. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Children may be viewed as public goods whereby both parents receive equal
genetic benefits yet one parent often invests more heavily than the other. We introduce a
microeconomic framework for understanding household investment decisions to
address questions concerning conflicts of interest over types and amount of work effort
among married men and women. Although gains and costs of marriage may not be
spread equally among marriage partners, marriage is still a favorable, efficient outcome
under a wide range of conditions. This bioeconomic framework subsumes both
cooperative and conflictive views on the sexual division of labor. We test hypotheses
concerning marriage markets, assortative mating, and men’s labor motivations among
Tsimane forager-horticulturalists of Bolivia and find that: (1) men and women both
value work effort in marital partners, (2) marital labor contributions are complementary,
(3) work effort is correlated between spouses, (4) total production is correlated with total
reproduction, and (5) better hunters have higher fitness gains within marital unions.
Keywords Sexual division of labor . Family .Marriage . Bargaining . Behavioral
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In one of the first systematic cross-cultural surveys of hunter-gatherer societies, Ember
(1978) found that only men hunt in 166 of 179 societies, both men and women hunt in
13 societies, and in no societies do only women hunt, whereas women are the main
gatherers in two-thirds of these societies. In a wider range of traditional societies, other
tasks, such as ore smelting, metalworking, and lumbering, are also exclusively male
activities, while preparation of vegetables, cooking, and bringing water are
predominantly or exclusively performed by women (Murdock and Provost 1973:
Table 1). Numerous explanations for a sexual division of labor have been offered over
the years, including those that emphasize patriarchy and ideology, biological or
physical capabilities and/or limitations, disparate reproductive strategies, and coordi-
nation and economic efficiency. Recent treatments justify the existence of pair bonds,
test the evolutionary significance of why men often choose high-variance production
activities and women low-variance activities, and explain cross-cultural variation in
divorce frequency (Bliege Bird 1999; Marlowe 2007; Panter-Brick 2002; Quinlan and
Quinlan 2007). An earlier paper attempted to explain the allocation of household tasks
among male and female family members of different ages (Gurven and Kaplan 2006).
Here we continue this line of inquiry using economic bargaining models but with
an evolutionary spin. We make no attempt to explain why men or women engage in
certain tasks in some populations but not in others, why divorce may be more or less
common in different populations, or how historical factors and cultural norms impact
temporal changes in the sexual division of labor. Instead, we focus on the following
central question: What impacts the relative amount of work effort that each partner
invests in household labor?
To investigate this question, we describe an approach elaborated in Gurven and
Hill (2009) and Gurven and von Rueden (2006) that attempts to (a) establish a
theoretical justification for an intra-familial division of labor, (b) build a conceptual
framework for understanding gendered roles in a division of labor that includes both
private and shared fitness interests across the life course, and (c) improve
understanding of power dynamics over the lifespan of households. Our approach
borrows from economic models of marriage markets (Becker 1973, 1974), sexual
division of labor (Hadfield 1999), household time and resource allocation under
divorce-threat bargaining (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981),
and “separate spheres” bargaining (Lundberg and Pollak 1993, 1994). In these
models, rational individuals gain more utility as a joint economic unit than from
remaining single; utility derives from a combination of household (including
offspring) and market production. Wage rates increase with human capital invest-
ment, and marriage markets govern the matching of potential spouses.
By focusing on combined “utility” of a joint unit, economic models do not
consider the fitness consequences of each partner’s activities within and outside the
marriage. An evolutionary interpretation is that men and women engage in pair
bonds (i.e., marriage) to achieve fitness benefits through the joint production of
offspring, and that joint production produces an economy of scale so that the
production of the pair is greater than the summed production of individuals working
by themselves (Kaplan and Lancaster 2003). Unlike in the economic model,
however, males and females can also gain fitness benefits from time and resources
spent outside the union. One or both partners may reduce investments in the union,
and/or disproportionately consume within-family resources. The proposed bargain-
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ing framework therefore subsumes cooperative and conflictive gender relations
within marital unions.
Although we focus on hunter-gatherers and forager-farmers under natural fertility
conditions, our basic framework is general and can be developed to help understand
gendered work effort in other types of societies. Here, however, we test predictions
using data collected among the mildly polygynous Tsimane forager-horticulturalists
of Bolivia. We show that productivity is a vital component of mate value; total work
effort is correlated among marital partners; work effort is relatively equal, but spent
in complementary, coordinated tasks between spouses; higher productive gains are
associated with higher reproductive gains; and, to some extent, within-pair
household dynamics are influenced by differential mate value between spouses.
Why the Sexual Division of Labor in the First Place?
Elsewhere (Gurven and Hill 2009; Gurven and Kaplan 2006; Gurven and von Rueden
2006) we have argued that four critical aspects of hunter-gatherer socioecology are
responsible for the sexual division of labor among foragers: (1) high offspring
dependency over a long period results in compound dependency of multiple offspring;
(2) an adequate diet requires macronutrients that are typically found in foods typically
procured by mutually exclusive means; (3) peak efficiency in many foraging activities
is delayed owing to time-dependent learning; and (4) some tasks exhibit sex-
differentiated comparative advantage. These conditions are likely common to most
foraging groups and are together responsible for a discrete sexual division of labor.
The average hunter-gatherer woman can expect to have five or six children over
her lifetime (Bentley et al. 1993; Hewlett 1991), with some groups like the Ache of
Paraguay showing higher fertility (Total Fertility Rate [TFR]=8). Human children
grow and develop very slowly and consume more food than they produce well into
their mid- to late teens (Kaplan 1994; Kramer 2005). Throughout a woman’s
reproductive life, she is therefore likely to have multiple offspring at varying degrees
of dependency. Even at ages of peak adult production, few women or men would be
able to feed themselves and all of their children without assistance from others (see
Gurven and Walker 2006 for estimates of age-specific dependency for low- and
high-fertility foragers). Meeting the high net caloric demand of children puts a
premium on cooperative arrangements that increase efficiency of production and
promote resource provisioning. Nuclear families are one possible arrangement, and
perhaps a minimally sized one providing fairly consistent and reliable consumption.
Also, depending on the environment, the nuclear family may be somewhat self-
sufficient, given the fission and fusion behavior of small groups whose larger
composition may change periodically (Kelly 1983).
Offspring need alone, however, is insufficient to promote specialization in
subsistence activities by sex or age. The macronutrient composition of foods and the
strategies used to acquire them also matter. Despite little consensus over the optimal
combination of lipids, proteins, and carbohydrates that should be consumed daily to
best promote growth, health, and fecundity, all three are necessary for healthy
growth, development, body maintenance, and reproduction (see Demment et al.
2003 and citations therein). A great deal of evidence suggests that protein-lipid
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resources and additional animal source micronutrients are often limiting factors in
people’s diets and hence more valuable than carbohydrates in many human societies.
Many studies show that increases in proteins and lipids lead to improved growth and
health in human societies (Larsen 2003). High protein-lipid foods are also critical in
brain growth, immune function development, and female reproductive function
(Milton 2003; Neumann et al. 2003). The human gut appears obligatorily designed to
eat a mixed macronutrient diet (Aiello and Wheeler 1995), and biochemical evidence
suggests that several essential amino acids (e.g., taurine, 20- and 22-carbon fatty acids)
are only obtained from consumption of animal tissue (Cordain et al. 2001).
Economic strategies must therefore produce complementary amounts of carbohy-
drates and protein-lipids (and probably other micronutrients). Most roots, fruits,
shoots, berries, and other plant and vegetable products tend to be high in
carbohydrates, sugars, and micronutrients but low in fats and proteins. Similarly,
meat from wild game, shellfish, and other kinds of fish are high in protein, and
animal organs, bone marrow, and brains are especially rich sources of lipids, but all
are poor sources of carbohydrates. Separate macronutrients tend to be packaged in
different foods so that a variety of items must be included as part of the human
omnivore diet (see Harris and Ross 1987). Game, fish, roots, fruits, honey, nuts,
insect larvae, berries, and other items common to forager diets are acquired by very
different techniques, and each requires specific knowledge. Whereas many foods in
foraging societies are difficult to acquire and require substantial learning, thereby
contributing to the dependency of hunter-gatherer children and adolescents (Kaplan
et al. 2000), many gathering, shellfish collecting, and fishing activities may be more
strength- or size-dependent than skills-dependent, so reaching adult-level produc-
tivity in these activities may not be as difficult (Bird and Bliege Bird 2002, 2005;
Tucker and Young 2005). In contrast, proficient hunting performance in several
societies develops over long periods of time. Among Ache, Tsimane, and other
hunting groups, making direct encounters with animals and killing them during
pursuits are two difficult components of hunting that require a long time to reach
peak skill levels (Gurven et al. 2006; Ohtsuka 1989; Walker et al. 2002).
When utility is provided by multiple foods, and acquisition of these foods
requires separate subsistence strategies that may require substantial learning, and
when increasing returns are gained with additional time investment, specialization is
a likely, if not inevitable, outcome, even if all group members are equally capable of
performing all tasks. Specialization maximizes household utility among cooperating
individuals that divide their labor to obtain complementary objectives by increasing
the proficiency with which tasks may be performed and by exploiting economies of
scale. This is essentially Gary Becker’s argument concerning familial division of
labor applied to the hunter-gatherer context (see Becker 1991; Bergstrom 1997).
Specialization does not lead to the conclusion that men should hunt or fish and
that women should gather or harvest. The sexes could coordinate on any
complementary set of economic activities, as in the classic Battle of the Sexes
game (Hadfield 1999; Rapoport 1966). Without increasing returns to specialization,
both sexes could be generalists and freely alternate between complementary
activities. A comparative advantage for one sex, however, coupled with a delayed
learning curve, could push men in one direction and women in the other. Pregnancy
and childcare constraints may be sufficient to give men a comparative advantage
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resulting in them being the sex that actively hunts (Hurtado et al. 1985; Lancaster 1978).
The comparative advantage is further amplified by men’s greater muscular strength and
body size. Men may also gain mating benefits from hunting, and these may further
motivate male hunting. However, these additional mating benefits are not necessary to
explain why most men hunt in foraging societies (Gurven and von Rueden 2006).
Instead, the signaling payoffs to hunting increase the overall returns to the activity, most
likely increasing the likelihood that men will hunt exclusively or under conditions that
might otherwise favor greater male involvement in gathering activities.
Children as Public Goods: A Bargaining Approach
Children can be viewed as a shared public good because they are a fitness outcome for
both parents, regardless of the investment each of them provides. To model optimal
parental investment, we consider partner fitness functions that contain shared household
(or public) and personal (or private) components. The task is to determine an optimal set
of time budget allocations for eachmarital partner and the resultant level of efficiency and
equity in the distribution of gains. Two extreme possibilities include “symmetrical”
marriages in which similar gains are realized by each partner and “dictatorial”marriages
in which only one partner determines the allocations to both (Manser and Brown 1980).
The existence of “deadbeat dads”—in other words, men who contribute little to
marriage unions (particularly if such unions are dissolved)—does not negate the fact
that an economy of scale associated with cooperation is an important feature of
marriage unions; unstable unions and unequal bargaining power owing to unequal
conditions or availability of outside options to each partner can lead to dissolved unions
and/or a failure of one or both partners to invest in household production and childcare.
The optimal amount of time spent investing in offspring can be illustrated through
the use of indifference curves. Each partner decides how much of their daily (waking)
time budget to spend in each activity. For ease of presentation, we group all work
activities into the category “household production” and all activities that yield private
gain as “leisure.” Work activities are those pertaining to direct resource acquisition
(hunting, fishing, gathering, farming, wage labor), food preparation (butchering,
cooking, cleaning, washing utensils, etc.), house maintenance (constructing houses,
making fire, collecting firewood, getting water, etc.), and childcare activities (bathing,
feeding, babysitting, etc.). Leisure includes social visits, relaxation and grooming,
pursuing extra-pair relationships, play, or any other activity that does not provide
utility to other household members.
The budget constraint is defined by the total number of hours that could be spent
in either household production or leisure. If we plot household production on the
x-axis and leisure (private goods) on the y-axis, the budget constraint line intersects
the two axes at the point where all time would be dedicated only to that activity
(Fig. 1). Usually a budget is a straight line, although it could bow outward if public
and private activities can be performed simultaneously, as when hunting both feeds
children and signals mate quality. Each partner maximizes the sum total of public
and private fitness gains subject to budget constraints by choosing an optimal set of
activities. These total fitness gains are likely to differ among husbands and wives,
generating the potential for conflict. Convex isofitness curves describe combinations
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of public and private goods that provide the same amount of returns in fitness (or
some proxy) units. Decision makers therefore receive equal benefits from any
combination of activities on the same curve. Curves more distant from the origin
describe higher returns. The shape of these “indifference curves” depends on several
key functional relationships, such as the shape of the fitness gains curve for
investments in (1) childcare and provisioning of offspring, (2) mate acquisition, and
(3) social status activities that provide both private benefits (e.g., mating benefits)
and public benefits (e.g., deference).1
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Fig. 1 Isofitness framework underlying a man’s optimal mix of contributions to household and private
goods. Straight diagonal lines represent budget constraints underlying a man’s use of time. Point A is the
optimal allocation of a man’s time to household and private goods, but this point lies below the woman’s
minimum acceptable level of household contribution, or “threat point.” Threat points are based on a
spouse’s opportunity costs to household contributions, where greater potential fitness gain outside the
union raises one’s threat point. A man will choose the suboptimal allocation at point B to avoid desertion
by his wife. The thick black budget line illustrates the case where household goods are more cheaply
acquired than with the thin black budget line. Under this scenario, the optimal mix is illustrated by point C.
As noted in the text, the shape of indifference curves depends on several key functional relationships
1 The indifference curve approach is useful for looking at trade-offs and has been used to model women’s
optimal time allocation to childcare versus food production (Hurtado et al. 2006). Maynard Smith (1977)
was the first to incorporate the trade-off between parenting and mate searching into a model of mate
desertion (divorce). Empirical investigation of these two factors has been explored in several forager
groups by Hurtado and Hill (1992) and Blurton Jones et al. (2000). When men’s activities have only
minimal impact on improving child welfare and mating opportunities are high (e.g., high operational sex
ratio=n reproductive-aged females / n adult males), pair bonds are expected to be brittle, divorce is likely,
and male parental investment should be low. This theoretical model has been tested to some extent;
however, the impact of men’s parental investment has been measured mostly in extreme circumstances and
using crude fitness measures, such as decrements to infant and child survival when a father dies or in
father-absent households. Results show that the presence of a father can have a strong effect on children in
hunter-gatherer societies where men’s contribution to the diet is high (e.g., Ache), but the overall impact
cross-culturally is variable and father presence appears to have little effect on child survivorship in most
populations (Sear and Mace 2007). However, the presence of other kin who contribute aid during the
absence of fathers makes exploration of true father effects difficult (Winking 2006).
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Partners do not make allocation decisions in isolation, so any consideration of
optimal behavior for men must consider the decisions of women and vice versa. Any
attempt to predict time budget decisions of men or women in isolation might lead to
the result that both partners should become generalists, which as argued above is an
inefficient outcome. Those considering marriage may have minimal expectations of
household contribution from potential spouses. These can be considered “threat
points,” which describe a level of expected contributions by the partner and their
presumed fitness effects; any level of effort below this threshold will result in
dissolution of the marriage, or perhaps a shift in allocation of effort away from the
household (Manser and Brown 1980). When a partner’s opportunity costs to
household investment are high owing to potential fitness gains outside the union (i.e.,
private good consumption), that partner’s threat point should raise to help offset lost
opportunities. Evidence for threat points is suggested by ethnographic documentation of
commonly desired characteristics for marriage partners and by commonly listed causes
of divorce (Betzig 1989). Studies among several tribal societies show that while men
value physical attractiveness more than women, both partners are concerned that long-
term mates display positive character traits, be hardworking, generous, and high
producers (Hill and Hurtado 1996; Marlowe 2005; Pillsworth 2008). These traits only
make sense if partners subscribe to the notion that the major gains from marriage are
both productive and reproductive. If women did not gain from marrying men and were
instead only gene-shopping, then we would expect much more polygyny than is
observed among foragers, and only brittle pair bonds.
In the conceptual model, an initial allocation decision between public and private
work effort is made by one partner, a reactionary allocation is made by the other partner,
and so on until one of the following outcomes is reached: (1) both partners arrive at a
stable equilibrium of contributions to the household; (2) the equilibrium is unstable and
eventually one of the partners will contribute everything; or (3) one partner always
defects and contributes nothing (Chase 1980). The second scenario suggests the
downward spiral of a marriage heading for divorce, where lowering of investment by
one partner results in an increase in the other partner’s investment. For example, a man
living matrilocally with his wife’s kin may reduce investments in the family if he has
access to extra-pair mating opportunities, while his wife may compensate with
increased investments in the family. The third scenario should also result in divorce,
except under the limiting case where the contributing partner has no other options. In
this case, if the wife from the above example has no kin or other bargaining chips, she
may always have to invest heavily in the household, regardless of the level of
investment of her husband. At equilibrium, the second and third scenarios may result
in the same unequal distribution of household contributions among partners. Usually
the optimal time allocation for the male partner (point A in Fig. 1) will not match the
solution that is optimal from the female point of view because husbands and wives
share fitness gains only through public (household) and not private investments. The
region between the optimal male and female solutions defines a set of time allocations
for each sex that is subject to “negotiation.” An important point to emphasize is that
the final bargaining outcome does not have to ensure equal levels of contribution by
men and women in marriage; rather it need only ensure that men and women both gain
more from these unions than they would from alternative options. However, in a stable
mating market where people tend to marry others of similar mate value (e.g., Schoen
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and Weinick 1993), differences in bargaining power might be small for a majority of
couples, at least in the initial phase of marriage.
Marriage commitments are likely to be highest when children are young and
partner reproductive value is high. Dwindling paternal investments may be expected
some years after the initiation of marriage if payoffs to further investment are small,
and if his partner’s reproductive value has decreased. However, the high caloric
demands of children and teenagers in a foraging environment often lasts until the
youngest child is independent, well into parents’ mid-forties and fifties (Gurven and
Walker 2006; Winking et al. 2007). Increasing child survival through provisioning
during the high-risk years of infancy and childhood (about 50% of hunter-gatherers
survive to age 15: Gurven and Kaplan 2007) is only one way that fathers contribute
to the welfare of their families. Fathers also foster transmission of cultural and
ecological knowledge, facilitate alliances, and provide social support during conflict
and direct protection from violence. Defection during the mid-forties, for example,
might be costly in terms of lost fitness relative to potential gains from starting a new
union. This is especially true if opportunity costs decline with age owing to his
decreasing mate value and expected productive lifespan.2
The next section describes seven predictions consistent with the theoretical
perspective outlined above, applied to an ethnographic test case among the Tsimane
in the Bolivian Amazon.
Predictions
P1: Marital preferences (related to “threat points”) should include economic
productivity or “work effort” for both sexes; this contrasts with a popular view
that women primarily value income, resources, and/or social status in long-
term partners whereas men primarily value physical attractiveness and fertility.
While men may weigh physical features higher than do women, both sexes
should rank criteria concerning productivity highly.
P2: Labor contributions within marital unions should be complementary. Given a
long learning curve for many activities, an efficient division of labor within a
household that pools its resources should not have its adult members engage in
the same activities. A stronger test of task complementarity should additionally
show that (a) men specialize in those tasks that are strength-intensive and that
compete with childcare, (b) women specialize in tasks more compatible with
childcare, and (c) tasks requiring substantial on-the-job learning should show
sex-specific specialization.
2 Attractiveness, status, wealth, specialized skills or abilities, productivity, motivation, and other potential
bargaining chips can vary among men and during their lifetimes. Attractive men with “good genes” might
invest less in children than less-attractive men who need to compensate with more long-term investment
(Waynforth 2001). High-status Aka men spend less time with their children than lower-status men
(Hewlett 1992). The opportunity cost of men’s time spent in subsistence tasks should also be affected by
the ease of encountering and wooing other potential mates given the number of male competitors, payoffs
to building and maintaining coalitions with other men and affinal kin, difficulty and productivity of
different foraging activities and the social currency of different foods, and availability of leisure activities.
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P3: At equilibrium, high producers should be assortatively paired. An efficient and
productive household requires active men and women. If work effort and
productivity are important mate choice criteria, a system of mutual mate choice
should result in similar levels of work between spouses, even though the
categories of work being done by each partner may be different.
P4: There should be higher reproductive gains among marital unions with higher
contributions to “public” household production, including childcare and food
production. Since Tsimane do not practice efficient birth control, any increase
in household production should be reflected in higher fertility and offspring
survivorship. Higher fertility may also motivate greater household production,
but this study lacks the longitudinal design to confidently assess the direction
of causality. Instead, we add spousal ages as controls that independently
predict fertility.
P5: Hunters’ higher social status should be linked to gains within marital unions
and not just private gains (i.e. extra-pair copulations). We posit that men’s
specialization in hunting is a coordinated outcome meant primarily to
complement women’s activities in a sexual division of labor, rather than
advertise phenotypic quality to non-mates. Therefore, better hunters should
show higher fitness gains within rather than outside of marital unions.
Additionally, the gains of social status (accruing from hunting reputation)
may include household benefits, such as childcare, coalitional support, health
insurance—all of which can improve the survivorship of household members.
P6: Relative bargaining power between spouses matters for leverage (i.e., getting
away with doing less). Even though we expect positive assortment based on work
effort (P3), those with more bargaining power may do less in-pair productive work
if more time spent invested in other activities provides greater private gain, and if
one’s spouse is unlikely to defect or reduce investment in the household. We
recognize that our ability to test this prediction is limited owing to the endogeneity
in our post-hoc bargaining power measure. Bargaining power is often difficult to
measure in a way that is independent of observed characteristics that influence
behavior, or that are not themselves outcomes, rather than determinants, of the
bargaining process. Relative bargaining power is here crudely operationalized as
relative mate value and measured in two different ways in two villages (see
“Methods”). Mate value is considered relative to one’s spouse, and also relative to
other same-sex individuals in the community. Since our bargaining power
measure is not independent of our dependent variable—work effort—our analysis
here is exploratory.
P7: The dynamics of work effort allocation may change over the course of a
marriage if relative mate value of partners changes over time. One simple
prediction is that if female reproductive value declines more rapidly over the
course of a marriage than male reproductive value, men’s relative mate value
becomes increasingly higher and husbands should be more inclined to seek out
extra-pair matings and other forms of private gain (Winking et al. 2007).
However, as number and overall dependency of offspring increase over time,
men will also have more invested in the marital relationship, and opportunity
costs for activities imparting private gain may be prohibitive.
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Study Population
Roughly 9,000 Tsimane forager-horticulturalists inhabit more than 60 villages along the
Maniqui River and associated tributaries in the Beni Department, Bolivia. Kin-related
families live in close proximity, forming well-defined household clusters. Tsimane
derive the majority of their calories from family-maintained fields consisting mainly of
rice, plantains, corn, and sweet manioc. Agricultural food is subsidized with wild game,
fish, foraged fruits, and some market goods (depending heavily on proximity to local
markets). General ethnographic information is given in Chicchón (1992) and Reyes-
García (2001).
Tsimane do not commemorate weddings with formal ceremonies but consider a
pair to be married when they sleep together in the same house. Cross-cousins are
preferred marriage partners, but distant relatives are often selected. Men often leave
their natal villages to seek mates during social visits, foraging excursions, village
festivals, and trips to town. Parents or other relatives may also aid in marrying their
sons or daughters. Suitors usually ask a woman’s parents for permission to marry,
although abductions and forced marriages are not uncommon (Table 1). There is no
formal gift exchange at marriage, although informal bride service is common.
Polygyny is widely accepted except in the two villages with an active missionary
presence. Overall, only 5–10% of men are polygynously married, almost always to
two sisters. Marriages are stable among the Tsimane, with less than 20% of
marriages ending in divorce (15 of 76 marriages begun >20 years ago). Divorce is
most common in the first year of marriage. Postmarital residence patterns tend to be
matrilocal until the first child is born, followed by patrilocal residence. However,
there is much flexibility in this pattern.
Nuclear families are typically the unit of production, particularly for garden foods.
Consumption occurs within extended family units living in close proximity to each
other. Family members may coordinate work activities in the early morning,
especially if one member intends to make a trip to a distant field or to a fishing
location by canoe. Hunts are often planned the day before, although the final
decision to hunt may depend on climate, physical state of the hunter, and whether or
not the hunter had an ominous dream during the previous night.
Methods
Many of the ethnographic methods employed to test the seven predictions presented
above have been described elsewhere (Gurven et al. 2007; Gurven and Winking
2008; Rucas et al. 2006; von Rueden et al. 2008; Winking et al. 2007) and so are
only briefly summarized here.
Economic productivity is operationalized as time spent engaged in work-related
activities. Time data exist for five villages totaling 28,347 time points. These data are
based on spot observations of household residential clusters during 2-hour and
3-hour observation blocks. During these blocks, all activities of members from
several families were recorded every half hour. Percentage of time individual i spent
in activity j is the percentage of all of i’s person-scans during which he or she was
engaged in j. Work activities are grouped into direct and indirect production. Direct
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production includes hunting, fishing, farming, collecting, and wage labor. Direct
“food” production excludes wage labor. Indirect production includes food process-
ing, cooking, getting water and other materials, washing and repairing clothes,
manufacture, and childcare.
Table 1 Mating Preferences based on (A) actual marriages and (B–E) hypothetical scenarios. In A, “% of
times listed” refers to the percentage of all cases where men (or women) listed a preference category (e.g.,
good character) in a spouse. For B–E, “Avg. Rank” is the average rank for each preference (from 1 to the
number of options for each question: 13 for B, 18 for C, and 16 for D and E), averaged over all women’s
responses
Question Men’s Preference
(n=107 men)
% of times
listed
Women’s Preference
(n=117 women)
% of times
listed
(A) “Why did you marry
this person?”
Wanted to 27.1 Against will 37.6
Good Character 21.5 Good character 17.1
Food/drink/helpful 19.6 Food production 15.4
Appearance 15.0 Wanted to 14.5
No other options 14.0 Kin arranged 9.4
Against will 11.2 No other options 6.8
Women’s Ranked
Preference (n=56)
Avg. Rank
(B) “What are traits
of a good father?”
N options=13
Cares for his children 4.1
Farming 5.2
Fishing 5.6
Hunting 5.8
Access to town 6.1
(C) “What are traits
of a good mother?”
N options=18
Loves her children 6.0
Clean house 6.6
Clean clothes 6.8
Good breastmilk 7.6
Fishing 6.0
(D) “What are important
traits in a man to
marry your daughter?”
N options=16
Wants only your daughter 5.2
Handsome/young 6.1
Wants many children 6.4
Access to town 6.4
Physically strong 7.0
(E) “What are important
traits in a man you
would marry?”
N options=16
Speaks Spanish 5.5
Handsome 5.5
Wants only you 6.9
Fishing 7.1
Wants many children 7.1
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Mate preferences were investigated in two samples. The first comes from
demographic interviews in fifteen villages of 224 adults over age 18. Participants
were asked: “Why did you marry this person?” This was an open-ended question
concerning the traits found desirable in their current or past marriage partner. Seven
categories were created based on responses: Active desire, Good character, Food
production, Physical appearance, Had no other options, Against will, and Arranged.
Each individual’s responses were scored as one or zero for the presence or absence
of each category. The second sample of 117 women from two villages (Ton’tumsi
and Moisisjac) focused on the desirable qualities of a good father, mother, man to
marry (if unmarried), and man to marry your daughter (for women already married).
Women were instructed to rank a series of fixed traits depicted in staged photos that
were designed to better facilitate understanding of the ranking procedure. Traits
included: Cares for children, Handsome, Good hunter, Productive farmer, Has access
to market town, Loves children, Wants many children, Speaks Spanish, among
others. For each question and trait, mean ranks were calculated by averaging the
ranks for each trait among all same-sex interviewees.
Mate value was measured differently in two villages. In Micdyiĉa, men were
instructed to imagine that they were single, that every woman in the community was
an eligible partner, and to rate on a five-point scale the extent to which they thought
each woman in the community would make a good spouse. The same was done by
women for men. In Ton’tumsi, the post-hoc measure of mate value differs by sex.
Female mate value was assessed as ratings of the physical attractiveness of other
men’s wives by a group of resident men. Male mate value was based on other men’s
evaluations of four characteristics related to social status: winning a physical
confrontation with another man, getting one’s way in a group conflict, community
influence, and respect. We average the rankings of the four measures to create a
single status measure for men.
Results
P1. Do marital preferences include work effort and/or productivity for both sexes?
Table 1 lists commonly reported desired mate characteristics. With respect to
actual mates, good character and food production were two of the top three
categories mentioned by both men and women (Table 1A). Good character refers to
kindness, generosity, and strong work ethic, but also includes “makes me laugh.”
Production, as mentioned by women, referred to men’s ability to produce food,
particularly meat, fish, and rice. For men, productivity among women referred to
traditional beer brewing from sweet manioc, and responsibility in childcare. Despite
the preferences stated above, almost half of women’s marriages were arranged by kin
or were a result of husbands forcing women to marry them. Arranged marriages
usually occur soon after a girl has had her first menses; despite a voiced
unwillingness to marry, however, few of these marriages end in divorce.
In the second sample invoking women’s hypothetical preferences, aspects of
economic productivity consistently appear in the five highest-ranked traits that
characterize a good father, mother, and husband (Table 1B–E). Good fathers should
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care for children and be proficient farmers, hunters, and fishermen. Good mothers
should love their children (i.e., be attentive to their needs), keep a clean house, and
ensure that familial clothes are clean. Tsimane women also report that having an
adequate supply of healthy breastmilk is important; not only do women sometimes
complain about not being able to feed babies sufficiently (interbirth intervals are
rather short, at 2 years on average), but women believe that healthy, strong milk is
necessary for proper child growth and development. A good mother also provides
fish as a supplement to the diet through hook-and-line fishing in acculturated
villages where husbands may be absent owing to wage labor opportunities.
Commitment to the spouse and desire for a large family are two important traits in
a husband. Finally, being handsome and young are largely unrelated to household
production but are nonetheless important traits in a husband.
P2. Are labor contributions complementary?
The Appendix lists 90 activities comprising nine categories of direct and indirect
production. Of those 90, 22% are almost exclusively male activities (defined here as
men participating in ≥85% of spot observations) and 27% are almost exclusively
female activities. Half of all work activities are thus highly segregated by sex. These
account for 46% and 49% of men’s and women’s work time, respectively. In only
11% of activities (accounting for 16% of men’s and 17% of women’s work time),
men and women were roughly equal participants (40–60% of spot observations).
Men specialize in hunting, wage labor, heavy farming labor (clearing, chopping
trees, weeding), and bow-and-arrow and net fishing. Women specialize in cooking,
food preparation, childcare, and domestic tasks. Figure 2 illustrates the complemen-
tarity—men engage more in direct acquisition and women in indirect production, but
summed together men and women spend roughly equal time in production: men
spend an average of 4.8 h per day engaged in work activities and women, 5.3.
Figure 2 also highlights changes in labor patterns as a function of age. Wage labor
peaks among men in their twenties, hunting peaks in the thirties and forties, and
garden labor peaks among men older than fifty. Much of direct parenting is done by
women in their prime reproductive years, whereas older women consistently spend
more time processing food. Direct productive tasks among women and indirect labor
tasks among men remain relatively consistent over the lifespan.
We test whether men specialize in strength-intensive tasks that are incompatible with
childcare activities, and whether tasks requiring substantial on-the-job learning are more
likely to show sex-specific specialization. We define specialization as ≥85% of time
points for an activity pertaining to only one sex. Each of the 90 activities was
independently scored by MG, JW, and a third experienced fieldworker, Amanda Veile,
as low (1), medium (2), or high (3) for strength requirements, skill requirements, and
incompatibility with childcare. Cronbach’s α was sufficiently high (0.886, 0.830, and
0.894 for the three respective measures), so we use average rankings among the three
scorers and recategorize low as 1–1.66, medium as 1.67–2.33, and high as 2.34–3.00.
Men overwhelmingly specialize in activities that are high strength (67% of men’s 18
specialist activities), high skill level (61%), and highly incompatible with childcare
(83%). We find that women specialize in activities that are low strength (96% of
women’s 23 specialist activities), low skill level (78%), and most compatible with
childcare (100%). Because high-skill activities tend to be high strength (Spearman rank
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correlation r=0.584, p<0.0001) and incompatible with childcare (r=0.657,
p<0.0001), we ran a multiple regression examining the simultaneous impact of each
of the three activity factors (fixed effects) on the percentage of scans where that
activity was performed by a male (Adjusted R2=0.68, df=6, F=64.16, p<0.0001).
Childcare incompatibility had the strongest predictive effect, with high incompatibility
activities showing an additional 47% (p<0.0001) more male participation than low
incompatibility activities. High-skill activities showed an additional 21% (p<0.001)
more male participation than low-skill activities. Strength, however, was insignificant
when the other two factors were controlled.
P3. Are high producers assortatively matched?
Men who spend more time in production are married to women who do the same
(Fig. 3). Although this relationship is highly significant, men’s production time
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Fig. 2 Percentage of time men and women spend in (a) productive labor outside the household and (b)
domestic labor inside the household
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explains only 17% of the variation in women’s work time. The slope of the
relationship between time men and women spend in daily production is less than
unity (0.41) and has a positive y-intercept, which indicates that men who spend less
than two-thirds of their time in productive tasks are paired with wives who spend
more time in production than they do, whereas men who spend more than two-thirds
are paired with less-productive wives. A similar relationship of the same magnitude
is found for the relationship between husband’s and wife’s direct and indirect
production time. Overall, women spend more time working than their husbands in
66% of husband-wife pairs. If we restrict analysis to those dyads where the difference
between the husband’s and wife’s production times is greater than 5% (i.e., 36 min),
women still spend more time working than their husbands in 56% of the dyads, men
more than wives in 18%, and both spend roughly similar time in the remaining 26%.
Alternative explanations may account for the correlation between husbands’ and
wives’ work times. First, spouses may both be adjusting their work effort according
to the number of dependent children they have as they get older. However,
controlling for ages of husband and wife, and for number of surviving children, had
no effect on the magnitude or statistical significance of the correlations between the
husband’s and wife’s work times. Thus, spouses are assortatively matched for work
effort not just because partners in any dyad have the same number of children.
Another possibility is that the spousal work time correlation is the result of the
bargaining process occurring during the marriage and may not reflect assortative mating
prior to marriage. Although this possibility is difficult to test given our data, it is worthy to
note that individuals of high mate value are also assortatively matched, based on analyses
using both measures of mate value (Micdyiĉa, β=0.74, std. β=0.58, p=0.0023;
Ton’tumsi, β=0.41, std. β=0.25, p=0.093). The relationship is stronger in Micdyiĉa,
where the mate value measure was identical for both sexes and the measure included
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wives. N=138 husband-wife pairs from five communities (Micdyiĉa, Cuverene, Aperecito, Ton’tumsi,
Jamanchi). The dashed line defines equal production time by husbands and wives
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any aspect of desirability, rather than focusing on only certain traits, as was done in
Ton’tumsi. Controlling for husband’s and wife’s age and number of dependent offspring
does not change the magnitude or strength of the relationship.
P4. Do high-producing couples have higher fertility?
For simplicity, we restrict analysis to monogamous couples who did not have
former marital partners. This reduces the sample from 138 couples to 120. After
controlling for husband’s and wife’s age (which will independently predict fertility),
the amount of time a husband or wife spent engaged in work labor was positively
associated with the total number of the wife’s live births and with the number of
offspring that survived to age 5 (Table 2). The combined total time spent working is
also significant, showing a higher standardized parameter estimate than work time of
either spouse alone. Each additional hour spent working is associated with about 0.3
more births and 0.2 more surviving offspring.
Further analysis reveals that husband’s andwife’s direct production times significantly
correlate with fertility whereas indirect production does not. Only husband’s direct
production predicts total number of surviving offspring.When we focus on subcategories
of direct and indirect production, three subcategories—men’s and women’s fishing, and
women’s childcare—are positively associated with fertility (standardized β in controlled
regression: 0.093, 0.093, 0.165, respectively). Men’s wage labor time and women’s
childcare time both positively associate with number of surviving offspring (β=0.123,
0.109, respectively). However, a husband’s time spent food processing was found to
negatively associate with number of offspring survivors (β=−0.136).
Although these analyses show trends consistent with the prediction that high
producers generate high fertility, it is plausible and expected that families with more
children will need to spend more time working. This is particularly true with regard
to time spent in childcare. For example, Hadza men increased food production while
their wives spent less time producing food and more in childcare when wives had
small children (Marlowe 2003). Parents with many children could also work more
intensively or efficiently, a prospect beyond the scope of the analysis presented here.
Only a longitudinal study could confirm that prior commitment to high levels of
coordinated work effort between spouses results in higher subsequent fertility.
Table 2 Regressions of reproductive performance (a: total fertility and b: number of offspring surviving to
age 5) as a function of work time, done separately for husband’s and wife’s and then for combined husband’s
and wife’s work time. Each row refers to a multiple regression that controls for husband’s and wife’s ages.
β std. β SE t p R2
A. Total fertility
Husband’s total work time 0.225 0.117 0.101 2.24 0.027 0.691
Wife’s total work time 0.277 0.141 0.102 2.70 0.008 0.697
Total work time 0.174 0.152 0.059 2.94 0.004 0.700
B. No. of offspring surviving to age 5
Husband’s total work time 0.194 0.118 0.084 2.30 0.023 0.699
Wife’s total work time 0.128 0.077 0.088 1.46 0.147 0.691
Total work time 0.113 0.116 0.051 2.23 0.028 0.698
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Nonetheless, we failed to falsify the prediction at this first stage; we found that
productive men are paired with productive women, and that higher work time among
both partners associates with higher fertility, even after controlling for husband’s and
wife’s ages. Regardless of the cause-and-effect relationship, and despite the fact that
current work conditions may not reflect commitments to household investment prior
to marriage, work effort should remain high among high-fertility households as long
as offspring demand requires it.
P5. Do better hunters have higher in-pair gains, or are the benefits they receive
external to the marital union?
Results from a recent paper are presented here (Gurven and von Rueden 2006).
Controlling for men’s age, we found that in a sample of 57 men from Ton’tumsi,
good hunters achieve higher social status. They were rated by other men as worthy
of respect (partial r=0.457, p<0.001), influential members of the community (partial
r=0.293, p=0.029), and likely to receive more coalitional support during a conflict
(partial r=0.248, p=0.065). Good hunters have higher in-pair fertility, in terms of
both total offspring (partial r=0.469, p<0.001) and offspring surviving to age 15
(partial r=0.379, p=0.004). The difference between hunters in the top and bottom
deciles is 2.8 total births and 2.3 surviving offspring. Better hunters are also more
likely to have wives rated as more attractive by other men (partial r=0.390, p=
0.009). In two remote Tsimane villages, where polygyny is more common, more
productive hunters have more wives (partial r=0.359, p=0.009) and are more likely
to marry earlier (mean difference=0.5 years, loglikelihood test, χ2=3.19, p=0.074).
In Ton’tumsi, good hunters were more likely to be ranked as “meat sharers” and
as “hard workers.” Hard workers also have a greater number of in-pair live births
(partial r=0.386, p=0.003) and surviving children (partial r=0.274, p=0.045).
Generous sharers of meat are more likely to receive coalitional support in the event
of a conflict (partial r=0.334, p=0.012), have wives rated as more attractive by other
men (partial r=0.342, p=0.016), and produce more total (partial r=0.280, p=0.040)
and surviving (partial r=0.254, p=0.064) offspring. When we control for both
hunting ability and age, however, meat sharing is no longer associated with higher
inpair fertility, whether measured by total (partial r=0.186, p=0.183) or surviving
(partial r=0.164, p=0.240) offspring. Controlling for meat sharing and age, hunting
ability remains a strong predictor of both total (partial r=0.338, p=0.013) and
surviving (partial r=0.310, p=0.024) offspring.
Neither hunting ability (partial r=0.185, p=0.173) nor meat sharing (partial r=0.116,
p=0.394) bore a significant relationship with extra-pair mating when controlling for age.
P6. Relative mate value should predict labor discrepancies among husband-wife
dyads.
Mate value can be assessed relative to same-sex individuals and relative to one’s
marital partner. Relative work effort can be assessed in a similar manner. Table 3
gives the results of regression analyses that examine the effect of a partner’s relative
mate value on work effort patterns. All analyses control for husband’s or wife’s age
and are shown separately for Ton’tumsi and Micdyiĉa because of the different
methodologies used to measure mate value in each village. Alternative specifications
that control for completed fertility or number of consumers (those younger than
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16 years old) in the household yield the same results. Of the eleven statistically
significant results presented in Table 3, only three are consistent with the notion that
having higher mate value (whether relative to same-sex competitors or to spouse)
should associate with spending less time engaged in work activities: Husbands from
Tom’tumsi with higher mate value than other men spend less time engaged in direct
food production than other men (std. estimate β=−0.374, p<0.01), while their wives
spend more time engaged in indirect work (β=0.305, p<0.05). Further analysis
reveals that these men engage less in garden labor (β=−0.460, p<0.01) and food
processing (β=−0.201, p<0.1), but more in wage labor (β=0.269, p<0.1), while
their wives are more likely to engage in parenting (β=0.447, p<0.01). Husbands
from the same community who rank higher relative to their mates are also less likely
to engage in overall food production than other men (β=−0.244, p<0.1).
Most of the significant results inconsistent with our predictions come from
Micdyiĉa, where mate value was all-inclusive. Those results suggest that men of
higher mate value are more likely to contribute labor time to direct work (hunting,
gardening). Men of high mate value, however, do engage less in parenting activities
(β=−0.381, p<0.1). Husbands engage in more direct work, and more total work
overall, than their spouse, the higher their mate value relative to other men’s. A wife
tends to spend more time in food production, and work overall, the higher her mate
value relative to other women’s. These results, which seem inconsistent with the
leverage hypothesis, are likely due to the mate value measures not being independent
of work effort. Work effort is an important trait for marriage (Table 1) and was
therefore probably a salient consideration in evaluations of men’s and women’s mate
value in Micdyiĉa. Thus, many of the analyses in Table 3 show that a person’s
higher mate value means they work more, not less, than we might expect according
to the leverage hypothesis. Other measures of bargaining power or leverage would
be desirable. Our results are therefore more inconclusive rather than showing strong
evidence against the leverage hypothesis.
P7. As relative mate value changes over the course of a marriage, does the
likelihood of male defection increase?
Although no longitudinal data on activity budgets yet exist to confidently answer
this question, a recent paper examined the timing of extramarital affairs by Tsimane
men in two less-acculturated communities (Winking et al. 2007). Tsimane men were
more likely to engage in extramarital liaisons early in a marriage when offspring
dependency was low, rather than later in a marriage when their wives’ reproductive
value was low. One-fourth of men were likely to engage in affairs in the first year of
marriage, and not until 10 years into a marriage did the proportion of men having
affairs drop below 5%, where it remained thereafter at this low rate (Fig. 4).
Frequency of affairs was negatively associated with number of dependents and age
of the man, even after controlling for the wife’s age and duration of marriage.
In the more acculturated community of Ton’tumsi, men’s extramarital affairs are
positively correlated with the number of dependents (r=0.260, p=0.051), but this
effect disappears when controlling for men’s mate value (partial r=0.051, p=0.711).
Compared with men in Micdyiĉa, men in Ton’tumsi on average experience greater
access to material wealth through wage labor, a principal source of social status in
this community (von Rueden et al. 2008).
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Discussion
A combined evolutionary and microeconomic perspective on family formation and
household work effort can help explain variation in marriage patterns and sexual
divisions of labor. When different tasks require substantial on-the-job learning and the
labor of different “specialists” is not easily substitutable, a sexual division of labor can
be a desirable enterprise because it results in comparative advantage, interdependence,
and economies of scale in total production. Although interdependence may require
spouses to cooperate for the production and maintenance of children, divisions of
labor need not be highly coordinated and efficient, and conflicts of interest are
expected based on differential private gain from non-marital pursuits.
We have shown that important criteria for long-term partners include notions of
work effort and productivity for both sexes. Productive Tsimane men are paired with
productive women, and these pairs show higher in-pair fertility and their children
show higher survivorship.
These results are consistent with studies in modern urban societies showing
positive assortment among mates on a variety of related characteristics, such as
socioeconomic status, cognitive abilities, values, interests, attitudes, and personality
dispositions (Buss and Barnes 1986; Schoen and Cheng 2006; Schwartz and Mare
2005). These findings support the notion that both husbands and wives benefit from
each other’s labor and that marital partners have incentives to optimize joint
productivity. Greater investments in indirect production, however, were not
associated with higher fertility; it is possible that time may be too crude a measure
of investment in work effort because it ignores the efficiency of actors during work
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tasks. However, another likely possibility is that the marginal cost of additional
children on time spent in indirect production may be small for many types of non-
depreciable or umbrella care, such as babysitting and passive childcare.
We also reported that in the unacculturated villages, men’s extramarital affairs
were concentrated in the early years of marriage, and not later when wives have
lower reproductive value. Even if women with children were less likely to divorce
their husbands after discovery of infidelity, owing to higher transaction costs in
finding a new partner and potentially lower mate value in the mating market
(Arendell 1986), we found no evidence that infidelity increases during the course of
Tsimane marriages in unacculturated villages. This result contradicts the view that
men’s investment in children is a by-product of mating effort decisions (whether
targeted at in-pair or extra-pair mates) and instead is more consistent with the view
that men’s contributions represent genuine parental effort, despite occasional
extramarital benefits that accrue to generous producers.
In the acculturated village, however, men’s extramarital affairs were not
concentrated early in the marriage but were closely tied to wage labor and material
wealth acquisition. The fact that in-pair fertility was also higher among wealthier
men suggests that these husbands are able to effectively allocate budget surpluses to
both private and household pursuits. Furthermore, men in acculturated villages
might have more opportunity to pursue extramarital relationships owing to the
greater divisibility and liquidity of wages and the lower risks of detection: many of
the reported affairs in Ton’tumsi occurred on logging excursions in other villages.
The generality of these findings in other societies has not been established. For
instance, Winking et al. (2007) argue that men continue to invest in the household,
rather than divert resources to the pursuit of additional mating opportunities, because
of the greater fitness gains from investment in the high number of dependent offspring
and grandoffspring characteristic of natural fertility societies. A 50-year-old Tsimane
man married to a 46-year-old woman, on average, will have 6.5 children—0.5 under
age 5, and 2.7 under age 15—and just under 8 grandchildren, all of whom are under
age 15. In the absence of growing dependency, however, we expect that conflict and
marital instability may increase throughout a marriage. The shift in relative mate value
between spouses could have a greater impact on behavioral patterns among couples in
Western populations who choose not to have children.
It is likely, as well, that men’s mate value in the matingmarket declines at later ages; a
man’s production declines in his fifties, especially for hunting, andmore so in his sixties.
His social status, whether measured as ability to win a physical confrontation, get his
way in group conflict, his influence, earned respect from others, or the sum of these four
traits, also declines at later ages (von Rueden et al. 2008). Thus, benefits of continued
household investment may remain high for men with relatively high fertility, while
lower opportunity costs may also favor continued household investment and less
infidelity. However, some high-status men may be able to support two wives or
successfully pursue additional mates when their spouse’s mate value declines, as we
found in Ton’tumsi, but these are likely to be the exceptions rather than the rule in
relatively egalitarian societies where men typically do not accumulate material wealth.
Socially imposed monogamy is therefore the dominant marriage pattern among
hunter-gatherers (Marlowe 2004; Murdock 1967). Infidelity by high-status men (or
women) may be tolerated to the extent that the amount of the man’s (woman’s) time
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and resources invested in the household is higher than what a wife (husband) could
gain elsewhere, especially given transaction costs of finding a new mate.
We applied our theoretical approach only to the Tsimane—a traditional forager-
farmer population with relatively stable, monogamous marriages for most individuals
and sororal polygyny for <10% of men. The sexual division of labor among Tsimane is
moderately high, with about half of all labor activities and roughly half of men’s and
women’s work time spent in tasks that are almost exclusively sex-specific. Similarly, 24
of the 50 “technological activities” documented among 185 ethnographic societies in the
Ethnographic Atlas show almost exclusive participation by one sex (where index of
male participation is ≥85% or ≤15%; Murdock and Provost 1973: Table 1).
The utility of our approach depends on whether it can help explain marital
arrangements and labor divisions in other types of societies. Our approach does not
uniquely predict which tasks should be performed by which sex, nor the extent of
women’s coordination with men other than biological fathers, but it does suggest
which types of tasks are more likely to show sex-specific specialization (P2). The
framework is general; wider applicability to a broad range of societies requires
information on (a) the set of economic activities and technologies necessary to
implement them (particularly skill and strength requirements, and compatibility with
childcare; Gurven and Kaplan 2006); (b) exchange and signal value of different
products (e.g., meat vs. plantains); (c) factors impacting value of household
investments, such as women’s fertility, paternity certainty (Gaulin and Schlegel
1980), and fitness payoffs to different types of paternal investment (Pennington and
Harpending 1988); and (d) factors impacting value of private investments, including
availability of alternative caretakers, and fitness benefits of social visitation and
“leisure.” Access to fertile women will be affected by the age structure of the
population, age gaps in mating partners, and social norms regarding infidelity.
Regardless of the normative arrangements for different societies, the specific
amount of spousal household investments should also depend on relative bargaining
power of spouses, which itself may be influenced by partner age, abilities, wealth,
and attractiveness. These factors can influence the power dynamics that determine
relative work effort within couples.3 However, we found little consistent evidence
that higher mate value, as measured here, correlated with a shift in household labor
toward the partner with lower relative mate value, or with lower work effort relative
to other same-sex individuals. When men’s mate value was alternatively measured as
social status, men spent less time in productive labor than did lower-status men,
while their wives spent more time in childcare activities. This occurred in an
acculturated village where high-status men engaged in wage labor and where greater
access to wage labor opportunities and markets likely produced greater variation in
men’s mate value than in the remote village.
As suspected, our inconsistent findings may be due to the fact that mate value is
influenced by the very labor contributions that it is predicted to impact. Although
controlled experiments can disentangle the bidirectional causality, anthropologists
3 Leverage can be gained if an individual is capable of performing necessary but difficult tasks, and there
are few other surrogates able to fulfill the role. Among the Tsimane, men and women spend comparable
amounts of time in garden labor, but women rarely chop down trees during the initial clearing of forest
plots. Widowed and divorced women often return to their natal villages and work in their parents’ fields,
whereas single men can still cultivate their own fields.
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cannot experimentally manipulate mate value as do ornithologists (e.g., Zuk et al.
1992). Longitudinal studies, however, exploring substantial changes in relative mate
value resulting from the attainment of high-status positions or employment, or
changes in physical condition (e.g., illness, obesity), should prove informative. A
final approach commonly used by econometricians is the use of instrumental
variables to correct parameter estimates when covariates are correlated with the error
term in a regression equation because of endogeneity (or omitted variables and
measurement error; Pearl 2000).
Prior quantitative studies of the sexual division of labor in non-market societies have
largely been cross-cultural in focus, using the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (e.g.,
Hendrix and Pearson 1995; Marlowe 2007; Quinlan and Quinlan 2007); these studies
take advantage of numerous variables quantified from ethnographies, such as
contribution to diet, residence patterns, extent of warfare, female independence, and
cultural region. Ethnographic biases aside, those cross-cultural studies focus only on
the contributions or aspects of “women” or “men” in general, and rarely on spouses as
part of household units. The current study lacks the scope of most cross-cultural studies
but instead offers a focused analysis of specific labor patterns of husbands and wives,
in relation to the cultural milieu of the Tsimane marriage market. It also examines all
forms of labor, rather than focusing exclusively on the direct production of calories.
The overemphasis on direct production is analogous to the traditional focus of
employment outside the home in sociological studies of the division of labor in
modern societies. Power and influence are often bestowed on high calorie producers
and moneymakers, and not butchers window-washers; however, work in production
may not be as important as the control of goods (Sanday 1981). Women’s role in the
distribution of food and other resources should be examined separately from their
role in direct production. Although economic independence is certainly an important
component of “female power”—the “unnamed, underlying variable in many
analyses of divorce rates in sociology and anthropology” (Pearson and Hendrix
1979)—the substitutability of women’s activities and the extent of interdependence
with husbands may be just as important in the social valuation of women’s tasks.
Throughout history it was rare that marriages occurred with full disclosure of
partner skills, dispositions, and behavioral tendencies. Given the many constraints on
actual mate choice in small, dispersed populations, it may not be surprising that 54%
of Tsimane women and 25% of men report that they married their spouse because
they had no other options or because the marriage was arranged by relatives.
Nonetheless, traits related to economic productivity are important, as shown here
among the Tsimane. Similar results have been found in all other studies of mate
choice criteria conducted in small-scale societies. Among Hadza foragers of
Tanzania, both men and women desire strong character and foraging ability
(Marlowe 2005). Desirable husbands among the Ache of Paraguay were skilled
hunters who “would work hard when everyone was tired” (Hill and Hurtado 1996).
Shuar men and women of Ecuador explicitly emphasize resource accrual as
important desirable traits in a spouse (Elizabeth Pillsworth, personal communication
2008). The process of declaring expectations and responding to a partner’s
commitment level can be monitored because of the matrilocal residence and bride
service patterns commonly experienced among new couples in forager and forager-
horticultural societies (Collier and Rosaldo 1981). Men must demonstrate their
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willingness to work hard and contribute food to the household under the supervisory
gaze of their new spouse and in-laws.
One of the few studies of facultative adjustments in partner behavior (aside frommate
removal experiments) was an experimental study of monogamous house sparrows
(Schwagmeyer et al. 2002). Contrary to the expectations of biparental care models in
which partners adjust facultatively to deviations in their mate’s parental effort (Chase
1980; Winkler 1987), the sparrow study showed that both males and females were
mostly insensitive to experimental changes in their mate’s parental behavior. The
authors argue that the “remarkable consistency of each individual’s [parental]
behavior” is consistent with the notion of “sealed bids,” wherein parental effort is
instead influenced by individual quality and developmental inputs. Conversely, an
observational study of male parental effort among Tsimane (Winking et al. 2009)
shows that men preferentially deliver direct childcare when their wives were busy with
other tasks or were away from the house, or when other potential babysitters (e.g.,
older daughters) were absent. That study provides evidence for coordination of
activities and suggests that men’s investment is not only a signal to his wife.
We hope to encourage more focused studies, especially those that are longitudinal
in design. Longitudinal studies would be ideal for examination of changes in work
effort by one or both partners after shifts in phenotypic condition that could alter
relative mate value and potentially impact costs or benefits of further investing. For
example, does sickness, injury, or aging in one partner induce an increase in spousal
labor? How does the changing composition of men and women in residential
communities impact willingness to invest in the household versus private gain? To
what extent do changes in the availability of alternative caretakers impact work effort
decisions by each partner? How do longitudinal changes in relative mate value impact
labor contributions (besides those universally experienced as a result of aging)?
Even when the conditions described above remain the same, slight changes in one
partner’s revealed commitment could induce behavioral responses in the other, leading
to the proverbial downward spiral toward overt conflict, and the need for readjustment
of allocations or perhaps, ultimately, divorce. Domestic strife is expected primarily to
result from failure of one partner to meet the expectations of the other, differences in
what those expectations should be, differences in perceptions of what constitutes
efficient coordination and equitable division of labor, and conflicts regarding
unobserved use of time, distribution of household production, and suspected
infidelities and paternity (e.g., Gottman 1994). All of these potential sources of
tension make sense in the context of a marriage or pair bond that has as one of its
implicit goals the coordinated production and reproduction of children.
The dynamics of “negotiation” merit further attention; a partner may threaten to
reduce work effort or perform daily tasks poorly as a kind of protest, even if doing
so is costly to that partner. Tsimane mothers often blame the sickness and especially
the death of newborns on the suspected philanderings of their husbands, and
husbands sometimes accuse their wives of being intentionally neglectful of their
infants. Such accusations urge spouses to become more committed to household
contributions. Consistent with this line of reasoning, postpartum depression has been
described as an adaptation to help women negotiate for more social support during a
critical time of need (Hagen 1999). Partners may also exaggerate their own
contribution while diminishing the value of their spouse’s to better optimize their
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own balance of individual and family investments, at the expense of family
productivity. Despite their cooperative nature, marriages are expected to contain a
mixed level of ambivalence, compromise, and conflict over household contributions.
Finally, our perspective offers a different interpretation of men’s foraging efforts
and the role of provisioning in human families. It has been actively argued that men’s
acquisition efforts do not represent true provisioning among hunter-gatherers, and that
provisioning cannot account for human pair bonds because meat and other resources
acquired by men are unpredictable or unreliable and they are shared widely with non-
household members (Bliege Bird 1999; Hawkes 1993; Hawkes and Bliege Bird
2002). Men’s participation in hunting or other risky, specialized subsistence tasks
cannot be judged independently of women’s (or even other men’s) coordinated
strategies, where members may pool resources together through distribution
networks (Jochim 1988). Among Tsimane, good hunters have higher social status,
marry at earlier ages, marry women viewed as highly attractive, and are more likely
to have more than one wife; their in-pair fertility is also likely to be higher than that
of poor hunters. Families of good hunters benefit from a consistent supply of meat,
and good hunters have higher mate value in the marriage market. That wives benefit
from being in unions, prefer hardworking, more productive men, and are angered by
their spouses’ infidelities is inconsistent with the view that long-term pair bonding
and the division of labor are outcomes of male mating competition. Even when
women’s roles are confined to “indirect production,” women can be dynamic players
during the negotiations that occur throughout a marriage; indeed, cross-culturally it
is often women who initiate divorce (Quinlan and Quinlan 2007).
Conclusion
In his classic treatise on the division of labor, Durkheim (1933:200) wrote that groups are
more functionally interdependent when there is a sharp division of labor between them.
Although he wrote largely about modern, industrial society, he said that the division of
labor is “characterized by a cooperation which is automatically produced through the
pursuit by each individual of his own interests . . . each individual consecrate[s] himself
to a special function in order, by the force of events, to make himself solidary with
others.”We have shown that a sexual division of labor is efficient, and can be favorable
to both husbands and wives, but it is not an “automatic” outcome of self-interested
individuals, and it is not always cooperative; the division of labor both separates and
binds people together. Following Durkheim’s sentiment, the greater interdependence
among partners as defined by implicit labor contracts organized under a sexual division
of labor may have helped facilitate the formation of (relatively) long-term, cooperative
pair bonds among unrelated individuals by decreasing the incentive for one partner to
defect on the other. Trust and effective communication are important to coordinate
work effort between spouses. However, for pairs, there may be a large set of possible
outcomes, the so-called bargaining zone, in which spouses gain or pay costs unequally.
Depending on the local socioecology and cultural milieu, a large proportion of
marriages may end in divorce and single-parent households. A stable marriage market
with relatively fixed pair-bonds and an equitable distribution of costs and/or benefits
between spouses may likely exist only under special circumstances.
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Appendix
Sexual division of productive labor among Tsimane. The percentage of total task-
specific observations where males and/or females participated, and the average
minutes per day each sex engaged in those activities. The bold numbers indicate
which sex allocates more time to the particular activity. Subtotals by sex for each
category of labor are italicized.
CATEGORY/Activity % by Sex Avg. Min/Day No. of Time Points
Male Female Male Female
WAGE LABOR
Logging 100 0 56 0 1,168
Merchant 100 0 3 0 65
Other (cook, translator) 85 15 2 0 52
Anthropologist 84 16 2 0 43
Bolivian national, field labor 100 0 2 0 36
School teacher 100 0 2 0 36
99 1 67 1 1,400
CHILDCARE
Holding 11 89 3 30 629
Suckling 0 100 0 12 233
Tending, coo, fan 15 85 1 5 124
Grooming hair 5 95 0 6 111
Swinging 8 92 0 4 86
Kiss or hug 19 81 1 4 81
Feeding 17 83 1 3 69
Play 27 73 1 2 48
Grooming body 4 96 0 2 47
Reprimanding, scolding 22 78 0 1 32
Comforting 20 80 0 1 30
Dressing 4 96 0 1 26
Bathing 0 100 0 1 15
10 90 7 74 1,531
OTHER FOOD ACQUISITION
Overnight foraging trip 63 37 9 6 289
Foraging, collecting 49 51 4 5 187
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CATEGORY/Activity % by Sex Avg. Min/Day No. of Time Points
Male Female Male Female
Commercial (buy/sell) 73 28 7 3 90
Domestic animal care 46 54 2 2 85
Visit merchant 27 73 0 0 11
60 40 22 17 772
MANUFACTURE
General, other 57 43 8 7 310
Palm thatch roof panels 43 57 4 6 209
Bring palm thatch 62 38 6 4 203
Weave fans, mats 14 86 1 7 151
Carrying bag (saraij) 0 100 0 8 143
Spin thread 0 100 0 7 129
Build house 87 13 5 1 119
Repair tools 74 26 3 1 91
Canoe 90 10 3 0 62
Hunting tools 96 4 3 0 56
Get other materials 85 15 1 0 33
Fishing tools 97 3 1 0 32
Get housing materials 88 12 1 0 25
Prepare paint (de-seed) 0 100 0 0 7
49 51 37 43 1,574
HUNT
Hunt, unspecified 89 11 15 2 356
Shotgun 100 0 11 0 225
Overnight 100 0 10 0 201
Bow and arrow 100 0 5 0 105
Rifle 89 11 3 0 72
95 5 44 3 959
DOMESTIC
Sewing/mending clothes 7 93 1 10 195
Clean 23 77 2 7 177
Get water 16 84 1 6 133
Tend fire 21 79 1 5 126
Firewood 36 64 2 3 92
Clear floor 64 36 3 2 87
Carries or brings objects 46 54 2 2 82
Sharpen (ie; stick or knife) 81 19 3 1 80
Shooing animals 28 72 1 2 61
Put things away 35 65 1 1 31
Tying knots, other materials 29 71 0 0 7
30 70 16 41 1,078
FARMING
Harvest 47 53 20 25 884
Chop (machete) 83 17 8 2 212
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CATEGORY/Activity % by Sex Avg. Min/Day No. of Time Points
Male Female Male Female
Plant 67 33 6 3 174
Clear 74 26 3 1 95
Weed 93 7 2 0 54
Unspecific 64 36 2 1 50
Burn 50 50 0 0 4
58 42 41 33 1,473
FOOD PROCESSING
Cooking, active 15 85 3 17 369
Cooking, passive 13 87 2 16 341
Peeling roots 15 85 1 9 189
Cutting 23 77 2 7 178
Pounding 23 77 1 5 115
Chewing 21 79 1 4 101
Grinding 4 96 0 5 99
Sifting 33 67 2 4 99
Make fermented beverage (chicha) 0 100 0 4 82
Mashing 11 89 0 3 57
Degraining corn 44 56 1 2 54
Serving food, beverage 12 88 0 2 51
Processing, nonspecific 30 70 1 2 50
Butcher/pluck 32 68 1 2 50
Straining 3 97 0 2 37
Drying 13 88 0 2 32
Scraping 19 81 0 1 27
Cooking, unknown 0 100 0 1 25
Shelling rice 29 71 0 1 17
Chicha food process 14 86 0 1 14
Prepare animals for slaughter 40 60 0 0 5
Slaughter 25 75 0 0 4
17 83 16 89 1,996
FISHING
Hook and line 66 34 13 7 397
Overnight fishing trip 53 47 6 5 217
Bow and arrow 87 13 8 1 180
Group barbasco (poison) 65 35 5 3 157
Technique unknown 81 19 6 2 147
Net 87 13 1 0 30
Dig/collect barbasco (poison) 100 0 0 0 6
69 31 38 19 1,134
Total direct and indirect production 50 50 289 321 11,971
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